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THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX:  REFORMING 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE 
TO COMBAT THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES 
OF BAN-THE-BOX LEGISLATION 
 
Nina Kucharczyk* 
 
As part of the larger movement to reform the criminal justice system, 
legislation has recently been implemented to expand job opportunities for 
formerly incarcerated individuals as they exit the system.  Specifically, “ban-
the-box” laws were passed to reduce widespread employment discrimination 
that formerly incarcerated individuals encounter by limiting employers’ 
access to criminal records.  While this legislation has increased job 
opportunities for formerly incarcerated individuals, it has had an impactful 
and unintended consequence in that employers use the applicant’s race in 
place of records to assume whether or not a criminal record may exist.  
Consequently, racial minorities without criminal records are facing 
heightened discrimination in jurisdictions with ban-the-box laws. 
To make matters worse, current employment discrimination laws fail to 
provide relief for job applicants who suspect discrimination in the hiring 
process.  As such, there is minimal legal recourse for racial minorities facing 
discrimination due to the ban-the-box laws and no incentive for employers to 
end discriminatory practices. 
This Note suggests a new approach to address the unintended 
consequences of ban-the-box legislation.  The solution to combat 
unconscious discrimination during the hiring process is not to eliminate ban-
the-box laws entirely; instead, lawmakers must modernize and strengthen 
employment discrimination doctrine to empower racial minorities who 
suspect discrimination and to ensure employers are critically analyzing their 
hiring processes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Collateral consequences, such as the loss of employment opportunities, 
punish formerly incarcerated individuals beyond their imprisonment.1  
Importantly, many of these collateral consequences increase recidivism, as 
individuals who cannot find employment and stable housing are more likely 
to return to prison.2  Problematically, research overwhelmingly shows that 
formerly incarcerated individuals face significant employment 
discrimination.3  The impact of this discrimination is extensive:  as of July 
2015, approximately seventy million Americans have criminal records—
roughly the same number as Americans with degrees from four-year 
colleges.4  Moreover, criminal-record rates are much higher in African 
American and Latino populations, resulting in an additional impediment for 
individuals who may also face racial discrimination.5  To seriously reduce 
the current recidivism rate,6 employment opportunities for formerly 
incarcerated individuals must increase. 
Legislation has emerged in response to this dire problem.  Specifically, 
many states have enacted “ban-the-box” legislation that prohibits certain 
employers from inquiring about a job applicant’s criminal record during the 
initial application process.7  Unfortunately, while this legislation aimed to 
increase employment for formerly incarcerated individuals, there has been a 
negative unintended consequence for minorities without a criminal record:  
 
 1. There are almost 50,000 federal and state statutes that impose penalties, disabilities, 
or disadvantages on convicted felons after they are released from prison. See generally 
National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL ST. GOVERMENTS 
JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ 
7XPQ-L6DV]. 
 2. See Joan Petersilia, Community Corrections:  Probation, Parole and Prisoner 
Reentry, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 499, 519 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011) 
(noting that a meta-analysis of over 400 studies shows that employment was the single most 
effective factor in reducing reoffending rates); see also Thomas P. Lebel & Shadd Maruna, 
Life on the Outside:  Transitioning from Prison to the Community, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 657, 661–63 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) 
(noting that finding employment and stable housing after release are among the strongest 
inhibitors of reincarceration). 
 3. See Lebel & Maruna, supra note 2, at 661–63; see also Petersilia, supra note 2, at 
518–19. 
 4. Matthew Friedman, Just Facts:  As Many Americans Have Criminal Records as 
College Diplomas, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
blog/just-facts-many-americans-have-criminal-records-college-diplomas [https://perma.cc/K 
A9T-HK3Y]. 
 5. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN 
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 1 (2003), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
piusp01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MEQ-8T44].  Approximately 5.9 percent of white men are 
expected to go to prison in their lifetimes, compared with 17.2 percent of Hispanic men and 
32.2 percent of African American men. See id. 
 6. According to a recent study, roughly 68 percent of released prisoners are arrested 
within three years of release. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005:  PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, 
at 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QTG-
L5MT]. 
 7. See infra Part I.A. 
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employers unable to see criminal histories assume minority applicants have 
a criminal record and stop hiring minorities altogether.8 
Now, lawmakers must balance the goals of ban-the-box legislation to 
increase employment opportunities for formerly incarcerated individuals 
with the reality that this legislation may unintentionally incentivize 
employers to discriminate more against minority men without criminal 
records.  This balancing act is especially challenging because minority 
applicants without criminal records have dismal prospects of winning 
employment discrimination lawsuits and, therefore, have minimal access to 
legal relief.9  However, if employment discrimination doctrine is 
strengthened and adapted to the current realities of discrimination, such as 
the prevalence of implicit bias, it may be possible to maintain ban-the-box 
laws and also provide legal remedies to minority job applicants who suspect 
they have been discriminated against.10  Moreover, the threat of an effective 
lawsuit will force more employers to proactively consider how unconscious 
discrimination affects their hiring decisions and ultimately increase the 
number of minorities hired.11 
Part I of this Note discusses ban-the-box laws that seek to reduce 
employment discrimination for formerly incarcerated individuals and the 
consequences of these laws on all minority job applicants.  Then, Part I 
synthesizes the legal options for rejected job applicants who believe they 
were discriminated against in the hiring process.  Next, Part II compares the 
two analytical frameworks used to evaluate evidence of bias in employment 
discrimination claims.  While one framework has the potential to provide 
relief for plaintiffs alleging unconscious discrimination, the other leaves no 
room to consider the role of implicit bias, leading to vastly different 
outcomes.  Finally, Part III argues that the solution to the increase in racial 
discrimination due to ban-the-box laws is not to remove this legislation.  
Rather, the unintended consequence of ban-the-box laws should motivate 
change to current employment discrimination doctrine.  Specifically, courts 
should adopt the mixed-motive framework—a more lenient evidentiary 
analysis—and the government should strengthen its commitment to 
collecting employment data.  Stronger employment discrimination laws will 
empower plaintiffs to bring lawsuits that have a higher chance of success and 
deter employers from discriminating against applicants based on unconscious 
stereotypes about the criminal propensities of racial minorities. 
 
 8. See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records and Statistical 
Discrimination:  A Field Experiment 2 (Univ. Mich. Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 16-
012, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795795 [https://perma.cc/H7K9-Z6QZ]; Jennifer L. 
Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers?:  
Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories Are Hidden 8 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22469, 2016). 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part III.A. 
 11. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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I.  BANNING THE BOX TO ADDRESS HIRING DISCRIMINATION 
This part discusses the recent wave of ban-the-box legislation 
implemented to address the hiring discrimination of formerly incarcerated 
individuals.  First, this part examines ban-the-box legislation, including its 
goals, its characteristics, and its variations from state to state.  Next, this part 
outlines the positive and negative effects ban-the-box laws have on hiring 
discrimination, including studies that suggest these laws have decreased job 
opportunities for minority males without criminal histories.  Lastly, this part 
details the basic judicial remedies available to job applicants that suspect an 
employer failed to hire them because of discrimination. 
A.  Ban-the-Box Legislation 
This section provides information about ban-the-box laws, including the 
background of ban the box, the legislative aims, the differences between 
states’ laws, and the studied effects of the legislation. 
1.  Background 
The negative effects of a criminal conviction on employment opportunities 
have become increasingly severe.12  More professions are requiring 
background checks and clean criminal records than ever before.13  
Additionally, technology has made it easier for employers to access criminal 
records.14  This push to increase background checks has proven problematic 
for many formerly incarcerated individuals; a 2015 report noted men with 
criminal records account for 34 percent of unemployed men of prime 
working age.15 
To address the debilitating effects of a criminal conviction, federal and 
state legislatures have enacted numerous policies to attempt to open the 
workplace to formerly incarcerated individuals.16  Recently, a new category 
of employment discrimination legislation has become popular:  ban-the-box 
laws.17  Although the language varies, this legislation generally prohibits 
 
 12. See Petersilia, supra note 2, at 518. 
 13. See id.  To make matters worse, the industries that are expanding, such as health  
care, education, and security, are exactly the industries that prohibit the employment of 
formerly incarcerated individuals. Id.; see also U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS HIGHLIGHTS (2017), http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ 
ceshighlights.pdf (“Health care has added 374,000 jobs over the past 12 months.”) 
[https://perma.cc/U8M7-3JUF]. 
 14. See Doleac & Hansen, supra note 8, at 8. 
 15. Binyamin Appelbaum, Out of Trouble, but Criminal Records Keep Men out of Work, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/business/out-of-trouble-
but-criminal-records-keep-men-out-of-work.html?_r=1 (“The reluctance of employers to hire 
people with criminal records . . . is preventing millions of American men from becoming, in 
that old phrase, productive members of society.”) [https://perma.cc/88ZY-JHJN]. 
 16. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 335B.020 (West 1978); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2007). 
 17. See generally MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, BAN THE BOX:  U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE POLICIES 
TO ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS (2017), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf 
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certain employers from asking applicants about their criminal history on their 
initial job application.18  The “box” refers to the question on a job application 
that asks if the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime, which the 
applicant answers by checking either the “yes” or “no” box.19 
Currently, a total of twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have 
adopted ban-the-box legislation.20  Furthermore, more than 150 cities and 
counties have also banned the box, including populous cities such as New 
York City and San Francisco.21 
2.  The Goals of Ban-the-Box Legislation 
Ban-the-box laws were passed to achieve two main goals.22  First, these 
laws strive to increase employment outcomes for individuals with criminal 
histories.23  The laws target the initial hiring process because criminal records 
have been shown to reduce the likelihood of a job applicant receiving an 
initial callback.24  One study demonstrated that for white formerly 
incarcerated males, criminal records reduce their callback chances by about 
50 percent.25  The effect was more pronounced for black males.  The study 
found that only 5 percent of formerly incarcerated African American males 
received callbacks, compared to 14 percent of their counterparts without 
criminal records.26 
Advocates of ban-the-box legislation assert that if employers are forced to 
evaluate the employability of the applicant instead of making stereotypical 
judgments, formerly incarcerated individuals will be hired more often.27  
While announcing the executive branch’s ban-the-box policy, President 
Obama reiterated this principle to a group of prisoners, saying, “If 
[employers] have a chance to at least meet you, . . . you’re able to talk to them 
about your life, what you’ve done, maybe they give you a chance.”28 
Second, these laws are intended to counter the deterrent effect of the box 
on a job application.29  One formerly incarcerated individual said that when 
 
(outlining the states and cities that have recently passed ban-the-box legislation) 
[https://perma.cc/PX65-HLHJ]. 
 18. See Doleac & Hansen, supra note 8, at 4. 
 19. See id. at 10. 
 20. See RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 17, at 1. 
 21. See id. at 2. 
 22. Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?:  Disparate 
Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 197, 211 (2014) (analyzing how disparate impact doctrine has been ineffective in 
protecting individuals with criminal backgrounds in the job market). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 955 (2003) 
(finding that 34 percent of white males without criminal records received callbacks, compared 
to 17 percent of white males with criminal records). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. at 957–58 (“The effect of race in these findings is strikingly large.”). 
 27. See Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box to Promote Ex-Offender 
Employment, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 755, 757 (2007). 
 28. Ari Melber, Obama Bans the Box, MSNBC (Nov. 2, 2015), http:// 
www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-bans-the-box [https://perma.cc/U9AH-HQZ9]. 
 29. See Henry & Jacobs, supra note 27, at 757. 
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she saw the “have you ever been convicted of a crime?” question on an 
application, she felt like the “air went out of [her] tires.”30  She knew that 
checking “yes” would essentially disqualify her from the job.31  Ban-the-box 
advocates hope that more formerly incarcerated individuals will submit job 
applications if the question is removed from the initial application, resulting 
in an increased employment rate for these applicants.32 
3.  Relevant Laws and Distinctions 
Ban-the-box legislation varies notably from state to state in three main 
ways:  (1) the types of employers and jobs covered, (2) the stage of the hiring 
process in which employers can inquire about criminal history, and (3) the 
existence of additional requirements on how criminal records can be used 
when making an employment decision.33 
First, while some states have enacted legislation that covers both public 
and private employment,34 other state laws address only public 
employment.35  Out of the twenty-five states that have ban-the-box 
legislation, only nine states passed laws that apply to both public and private 
employers.36  Most state laws cover only public employers, such as 
government agencies, but have no effect on private companies.37 
Additionally, states have exemptions for certain jobs ranging from law 
enforcement officers to barbers.  For instance, Louisiana’s legislation 
exempts any position where the law requires a background check38 and 
restricts employment licenses for a wide range of fields.39  Most commonly, 
states have restrictions on jobs that involve caring for children or the 
elderly.40 
Second, states differ as to when an employer may ask a job applicant about 
his criminal record.  For example, some states require that an employer wait 
until a conditional offer is made.41  Then, the employer can withdraw the 
offer if a criminal record is uncovered.42  In Rhode Island and Maryland, 
 
 30. Lydia DePillis, Millions of Ex-Cons Still Can’t Get Jobs.  Here’s How the White 
House Could Help Fix That, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/storyline/wp/2015/01/22/millions-of-ex-cons-still-cant-get-jobs-heres-how-the-white-
house-could-help-fix-that/ [https://perma.cc/UN69-VWMQ]. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Smith, supra note 22, at 211. 
 33. For a more detailed discussion of the differences in ban-the-box legislation, see 
Christina O’Connell, Ban the Box:  A Call to the Federal Government to Recognize a New 
Form of Employment Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801 (2015). 
 34. Public employment tends to cover state, city, and district jobs and may also include 
government agencies; private employment refers to private companies. See id. at 2820–21. 
 35. See RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 17, at 6–14. 
 36. See id. These states are Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 42:1701 (2016). 
 39. See id. § 37:2950 (exempting licensing agencies for education, physical therapy, 
architects, funeral directors, and more). 
 40. See O’Connell, supra note 33, at 2807. 
 41. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 1998). 
 42. Id. 
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employers must wait until the first interview to inquire, either orally or in 
writing, whether the applicant has ever been arrested, charged with, or 
convicted of any crime.43  However, some statutes give employers more 
flexibility about when they can request information about the applicant’s 
criminal history.44  For example, New Jersey’s vague statute does not allow 
an employer to make any inquiries about the applicant’s criminal record 
during the “initial employment application process.”45 
Finally, some states provide additional protection for convicted criminals 
and require that the conviction have a “direct” or “rational” relationship to 
the position applied for.46  In Hawaii, for example, both public and private 
employers are prohibited from inquiring about criminal convictions until 
after a conditional offer has been extended.47  Then, the offer can be 
rescinded only if the potential employee’s conviction record “bears a rational 
relationship to the duties and responsibilities of the position.”48  Additionally, 
Virginia’s executive order declares that state employment decisions cannot 
be based on criminal records unless those decisions are “demonstrably job-
related and consistent with business necessity.”49  In contrast, other states 
have no relatedness requirement so it is entirely lawful for an employer to 
reject the applicant due to his criminal record, even when the applicant’s 
conviction record has no bearing on his ability to do the job.50 
4.  Effects of Ban-the-Box Legislation 
Although ban-the-box laws are relatively new, some scholars have 
researched the effects of this legislation on various states and cities where the 
laws were enacted.  This subsection outlines recent studies on the 
effectiveness and consequences of ban-the-box legislation. 
 
 43. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-203 (West 2013); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 28-5-7 (West 2013). 
 44. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-14 (West 2014). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101 (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 378-2.5; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West 2013).  In addition to state laws, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has also recommended that inquiries about 
convictions be “limited to convictions for which exclusion would be job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity.” See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST 
AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964, at 14 (2012). 
 47. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5. 
 48. Id.  Colorado requires a “direct relationship” between the conviction and the job. See 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101. 
 49. 31 Va. Reg. Regs. 1451 (Apr. 20, 2015). 
 50. See RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 17, at 14–15 (outlining a complete list of states 
with ban-the-box laws and relatedness requirements). 
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a.  Positive Outcomes 
Ban-the-box laws have succeeded in increasing callback and employment 
rates for formerly incarcerated individuals in many places.51  For example, 
since the start of the ban-the-box initiative, the number of formerly 
incarcerated individuals hired by the city of Durham in North Carolina has 
increased sevenfold, from 2.25 percent of city employees having criminal 
histories in 2011 to 15.53 percent in 2014.52  In the District of Columbia, the 
number of applicants with records increased both numerically and as a 
percentage of all hires after the law took effect.53  After the law, there was a 
33 percent increase in the number of applicants with records hired, which 
resulted in 21 percent of all new hires in D.C. being people with criminal 
records.54 
Furthermore, there is promising research demonstrating that an increase in 
employment opportunities for formerly incarcerated individuals has a 
positive effect on society as a whole.  Economists believe that hiring 
individuals with criminal histories benefits the job market and the economy 
generally.55  Employing formerly incarcerated individuals can also reduce 
costs for society because employment has been shown to reduce recidivism.56 
b.  Inefficiencies 
Politicians and criminal justice reform advocates have largely lauded ban-
the-box legislation and view these laws as an important step to aiding 
 
 51. For a summary of multiple studies on the effectiveness of ban-the-box laws, see 
ANASTASIA CHRISTMAN & MICHELLE N. RODRIGUEZ, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, RESEARCH 
SUPPORTS FAIR-CHANCE POLICIES (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Fair-Chance-
Ban-the-Box-Research.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLD5-HTZA]. 
 52. DARYL V. ATKINSON & KATHLEEN LOCKWOOD, S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, 
THE BENEFITS OF BAN THE BOX:  A CASE STUDY OF DURHAM, NC (2014), 
http://www.southerncoalition.org/program-areas/criminal-justice/ban-the-box-community-
initiative-guide/benefits-ban-box/ [https://perma.cc/77G6-CPLM]. 
 53. OFFICE OF THE D.C. AUDITOR, THE IMPACT OF “BAN THE BOX” IN THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 17 (2016), http://www.dcauditor.org/sites/default/files/FCRSA%20-%20Ban% 
20the%20Box%20Report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C82-FKVD]. 
 54. See id.  It is important to note that the District of Columbia enacted a comprehensive 
ban-the-box law that only permits an employer to reject a job applicant with a criminal record 
for a “legitimate business reason.” D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1342 (West 2014).  The statute 
outlines six factors to consider including the specific duties of the employment, the fitness and 
ability of the applicant to perform those duties given the nature of the offense, the age of the 
applicant at the time of the offense, and the time elapsed since the occurrence of the offense. 
See id. 
 55. See ALAN BARBER & CHERRIE BUCKNOR, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE 
PRICE WE PAY:  ECONOMIC COSTS OF BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT FOR FORMER PRISONERS AND 
PEOPLE CONVICTED OF FELONIES 1 (2016), http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/employment-
prisoners-felonies-2016-06.pdf?v=5 (“In terms of the cost to the economy as a whole, 
[research] suggests a loss of about $78 to $87 billion in annual [gross domestic product].”) 
[https://perma.cc/XX37-8QEV]. 
 56. See Mark T. Berg & Beth M. Huebner, Reentry and the Ties That Bind:  An 
Examination of Social Ties, Employment, and Recidivism, 28 JUST. Q. 382, 396–405 (2011). 
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prisoner reentry.57  However, ban-the-box laws have also been criticized.58  
First, these laws are less effective on a national level because the current laws 
assist only a small number of people.59  More than half of the states do not 
have any ban-the-box laws and, in the states that do have them, many 
employers are not required to follow them because of the numerous 
exceptions commonly laid out by state legislators.60  Additionally, many 
critics of ban-the-box legislation feel that this legislation does not stop 
discrimination but instead just delays the hiring process.61  After waiting to 
inquire about criminal history, many employers still do not end up hiring the 
applicant when his conviction record is exposed, which is inefficient and 
costly to the employer.62 
These problems do not present a fatal flaw to ban-the-box legislation.  If 
ban-the-box laws are continually praised by the executive branch, then other 
politicians, larger companies, and more employers who are not legally bound 
to eliminate the question on their job applications may choose to do so 
voluntarily.63  Furthermore, while the laws may cause some delays and added 
costs in the hiring process, these limitations must be balanced with the strong 
interest in increasing employment for formerly incarcerated individuals. 
c.  Racial Discrimination 
Ban-the-box legislation, however, faces a more detrimental critique that 
undermines its very objective.  While the purpose of ban-the-box laws is to 
expand access to employment for all formerly incarcerated individuals, 
recent studies have shown that these laws may in fact decrease employment 
access for black and Hispanic men.64 
One recent study, conducted by Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr, found that 
ban-the-box legislation results in statistically significant racial discrimination 
against black males.65  The researchers sent approximately 15,000 job 
 
 57. President Obama was a tremendous advocate of ban-the-box legislation. See Melber, 
supra note 28. 
 58. See Smith, supra note 22, at 216–18. 
 59. See id. at 216. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Juanita Duggan, Opinion, Ban the Box Ignores Employers’ Legitimate Concerns, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016, 3:21 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/13/ 
should-a-jail-record-be-an-employers-first-impression/ban-the-box-ignores-employers-
legitimate-concerns (“An owner may spend weeks into the hiring process only to find a worker 
is disqualified because of his record.  Lost time is lost income.”) [https://perma.cc/6B6Y-
4FQC]. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See, e.g., Mark Holden, Opinion, Employers Should Decide on Their Own to Ban the 
Box, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016, 3:21 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/ 
04/13/should-a-jail-record-be-an-employers-first-impression/employers-should-decide-on-
their-own-to-ban-the-box (noting the positive effects of banning the box on Koch Industries’s 
workforce and encouraging other employers to follow suit) [https://perma.cc/DR86-HXH7]. 
 64. See Ben Leubsdorf, ‘Ban the Box’ Laws May Worsen Hiring Discrimination, New 
Research Finds, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ban-the-box-laws-
may-worsen-hiring-discrimination-new-research-finds-1475520896 [https://perma.cc/J5H4-
JJB2]. 
 65. See Agan & Starr, supra note 8. 
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applications with “racially distinctive” names in New York and New Jersey 
before and after the implementation of the ban-the-box policy.66  These 
applications were sent in pairs; the paired applicants had the same credentials 
and criminal records but different names—one with a typically white name 
and one with a typically black name.67  The authors found that before the 
legislation was enacted and employers could freely ask about criminal 
records, the callback rate68 for applicants with criminal records was 
essentially the same for both races:  the white average was 11.1 percent and 
the black average was 10.9 percent.69  However, the racial gap in callbacks 
increased drastically after ban-the-box legislation was passed.70  After ban-
the-box implementation, white applicants were 45 percent more likely than 
black applicants to receive a callback, compared to being just 7 percent more 
likely before the laws.71  In sum, the racial gap in callback rates became six 
times larger after ban-the-box legislation went into effect.72 
To account for this distinction, Agan and Starr propose two plausible, and 
not mutually exclusive, explanations.73  First, “statistical discrimination” 
against black men could explain this result; employers treat all black men as 
if they have a high probability of possessing a criminal record.74  Secondly, 
ban the box could increase benefits for white applicants based on the 
stereotype that white men are less likely to have criminal convictions.75 
In another study, researchers tested the effect of ban-the-box policies on 
black and Hispanic men.76  The study concluded that ban-the-box laws 
decrease the probability of being employed by 5.1 percent for young, low-
skilled black men and 2.9 percent for young, low-skilled Hispanic men.77  
The authors hypothesized that when information on criminal records is 
available and used, employers are more likely to hire low-skilled black and 
Hispanic men without criminal records.78  When criminal records are 
prohibited, however, employers use race as a proxy for criminal records.79  
 
 66. See id. at 2–3, 12. 
 67. See id. at 11.  To identify racially distinctive names, the authors used birth certificate 
data for babies born between 1989 and 1996, which encompasses the age group of the 
applicants.  To qualify as a racially distinctive name, the name had to meet a threshold 
requirement for the percentage of babies given that name who were black or non-Hispanic 
white. See id. at 12–13. 
 68. A callback is defined as a voicemail or email from an employer requesting that the 
applicant contact the employer or requesting an interview. Id. at 15. 
 69. See id. at 17. 
 70. See id. at 33. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 34.  
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. at 34–35. 
 76. See Doleac & Hansen, supra note 8, at 4. 
 77. Id. at 26.  The authors focused on low-skilled workers because, on average, ex-
offenders have less education and job experience than nonoffenders. See id. at 3–4. 
 78. See id. at 26. 
 79. See id. at 8.  The authors cite additional studies that found a similar effect with other 
employment information.  For example, when employers mandated drug tests for employees, 
black employment rates increased by 7 to 30 percent. See id. at 9.  Relatedly, another study 
concluded that bans on credit checks decreased job-finding rates for black applicants by 7 to 
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Minority applicants, therefore, are denied a chance to even get their foot in 
the door because employers assume that they have criminal records, even 
when they do not. 
The outcomes of these studies are problematic:  while they show that ban-
the-box laws are helping formerly incarcerated individuals,80 they also show 
that employers are discriminating against minority applicants by guessing the 
probability of the presence of a criminal record based on race.81  If the goal 
of employment discrimination legislation is to increase opportunities not only 
for formerly incarcerated individuals but also for minorities without criminal 
records, then ban-the-box legislation undermines this goal. 
B.  Employment Discrimination Doctrine 
in the Age of Unconscious Discrimination 
The decline in hiring people of color in jurisdictions that have 
implemented ban-the-box legislation is concerning.  Agan and Starr have 
attributed the decline to unconscious discrimination:  when criminal records 
are unavailable, employers implicitly use race as a proxy for whether an 
applicant may have a criminal record.82  For this reason, it is imperative to 
understand the differences between conscious and unconscious 
discrimination and how unconscious discrimination flourishes in 
jurisdictions with ban-the-box laws. 
1.  Unconscious Discrimination 
in the Employment Realm 
In the late 1980s, sociologists and legal scholars began studying 
discrimination, mainly focusing on the distinctions between conscious and 
unconscious discrimination.83  Conscious discrimination is typically 
manifested through inappropriate remarks or outward biased treatment of a 
certain group.84  Unconscious discrimination, however, is based on cultural 
or emotional factors that might be unknown to the person.85 
More recently, scholars have proposed that there are two separate systems 
of cognitive operations that influence how individuals react to different 
proxies for race and gender.86  In the system aligned with conscious 
discrimination, the deductions are “deliberative, calculative, [and] slower.”87  
 
16 percent. See id.  Both of these studies support the idea that when employers have less 
information, they are more likely to make negative assumptions about black men. See id. 
 80. See Agan & Starr, supra note 8, at 32. 
 81. See id. at 33–38. 
 82. See id. at 37–38. 
 83. See Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination:  Firm-
Based Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 347, 359 (2008) (citing 
Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987)). 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
969, 973–76 (2006). 
 87. Id. at 974. 
2017] THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX 2815 
Conversely, our unconscious system is rapid and error prone, where 
individuals make quick assumptions based on limited information.88  Often, 
these assumptions are based on cognitive shortcuts that rely on stereotypes, 
and therefore, the deductions made under this system are often inaccurate.89 
Moreover, researchers hypothesized factors that make unconscious 
discrimination more likely to occur.  First, as the acceptance of overt racism 
in the workplace has decreased, unconscious discrimination has become 
more common than conscious discrimination.90  Some researchers believe 
that employers are less likely to use race as a factor in their decisions when 
their decision could be seen as visibly racist.91  For example, when 
participants in a study were asked to evaluate applicants, they chose the 
highly qualified black candidate 91 percent of the time over a clearly less 
qualified white candidate.92  However, when the black candidate’s 
qualifications were lowered but were still satisfactory, the black candidate 
was recommended only 45 percent of the time, while the white candidate 
with the same credentials was recommended 76 percent of the time.93  
According to the researchers of this study, decision makers are much more 
likely to discriminate where they have more discretion and can justify their 
behavior on the basis of something other than race, such as less-robust 
credentials.94  That is, individuals are likely to select the black candidate 
when he is clearly the most qualified because the decision maker has less 
discretion.  But as soon as the candidate’s qualifications are lowered, 
individuals are much less likely to select the black candidate, even over the 
less qualified white candidate, because they can justify the decision on 
something other than race. 
Additionally, studies show that when individuals have less information 
about a person, they are more likely to use cognitive shortcuts to assume 
information about that person.95  When employers do not have access to 
information, they will rely on generalizations about gender or racial groups 
to make assumptions about an applicant’s productivity and employability.96  
Thus, when a group is associated with higher productivity, an individual in 
that group is more likely to get the job based on these generalizations.97 
 
 88. See id. at 974–75. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Tolson, supra note 83, at 356–58. 
 91. See John F. Dovidio et al., Why Can’t We Just Get Along?:  Interpersonal Biases and 
Interracial Distrust, 8 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 88, 90–92 (2002). 
 92. See id. at 92. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 90; see also L. Song Richardson & Philip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias 
in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2628 (2013) (noting that implicit biases are 
particularly influential where decision making is highly discretionary). 
 95. See Hanming Fang & Andrea Moro, Theories of Statistical Discrimination and 
Affirmative Action:  A Survey, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS 133, 137 (J. Benhabib et 
al. eds., 2011). 
 96. See id. at 135–40 (analyzing numerous studies and economic models to show how 
employers use assumptions about productivity and risk to hire applicants when there is limited 
information). 
 97. See id. 
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This theory applies to other contexts as well.  For example, one study found 
that a ban on credit checks reduced employment rates for African American 
and young job applicants.98  Conversely, legislation that enabled employers 
to conduct drug testing increased employment rates for blacks; the largest 
positive effect was seen with low-skilled black males.99  Both of these studies 
further suggest that when employers have less information about job 
applicants, they are more likely to use racial assumptions in their hiring 
decisions. 
2.  Unconscious Discrimination 
and Ban-the-Box Laws 
Postimplementation studies of ban-the-box laws suggest that unconscious 
discrimination is prevalent during the hiring process.100  While some 
employers may intentionally use race to influence their hiring decisions, it is 
more likely that employers are unaware of their biases as they are sifting 
through job applications.101  Analyses of implicit aptitude tests102 (IATs) 
show that unconscious attitudes and stereotypes are widespread across 
demographic groups.103  Furthermore, research has shown that the implicit 
association between African Americans and crime is particularly strong and 
influential on cognitive processing.104 
Therefore, in Agan and Starr’s ban-the-box study, employers were likely 
subconsciously using race as a proxy for criminal records when they are 
prohibited from accessing criminal information.105  With limited 
information, employers rely on other implicit shortcuts, such as the names of 
the applicants, to predict criminality when making hiring decisions.106 
Although this data demonstrates that extensive unconscious discrimination 
is harming minority job applicants without criminal records, it would be 
unwise to eliminate ban-the-box laws because research also establishes that 
the laws are indeed assisting formerly incarcerated individuals to reenter the 
job market.107  However, legal scholars must ensure that there are sufficient 
 
 98. See Robert Clifford & Daniel Shoag, “No More Credit Score”:  Employment Credit 
Check Bans and Signal Substitution 20 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP16-
008, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746642 [https://perma.cc/ 
VM2B-CYNN]. 
 99. See Abigail Wozniak, Discrimination and the Effects of Drug Testing on Black 
Employment, 98 REV. ECON. & STAT. 548, 557–65 (2015). 
 100. See Agan & Starr, supra note 8, at 38. 
 101. See id. (“Lab experiments on implicit biases have consistently found that most 
Americans make such assumptions subconsciously.”); see also Brian A. Nosek et al., 
Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 2007 EUR. REV. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1, 40–43. 
 102. See Nosek et al., supra note 101, at 7–8. 
 103. See id. at 10–22. 
 104. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black:  Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 
87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 889 (2004). 
 105. See Agan & Starr, supra note 8, at 34–35. 
 106. See id. at 37. 
 107. See id. at 37–40 (discussing how the policy implications associated with ban-the-box 
laws can be balanced to maximize interests). 
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legal remedies available for rejected job applicants who suspect unconscious 
racial discrimination in the hiring process. 
C.  Current Title VII Employment Discrimination Remedies 
One way to reduce discriminatory employment practices is to allow 
plaintiffs to bring lawsuits.  Job applicants without criminal records who 
suspect they have been discriminated against based on race may file an 
employment discrimination lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Title VII allows individuals to sue employers for discrimination on the 
basis of race, gender, religion, or national origin.108  Section 703 of Title VII 
provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants from 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.109 
Based on the Court’s interpretation of this statute, there are two types of 
employment discrimination claims:  (1) disparate impact and (2) disparate 
treatment.110  Disparate impact applies to situations where an employment 
practice has a discriminatory effect on a certain group of applicants or 
employees.111  Disparate treatment applies when an employer treats an 
individual differently because of his membership in a protected class.112 
If rejected applicants can successfully sue employers, then employers will 
be forced to recognize their implicit racism and will be less likely to 
discriminate.  Accordingly, the negative consequences of ban-the-box laws 
will be mitigated, and formerly incarcerated individuals will have greater 
chances of securing jobs without reducing employment opportunities for 
minorities without criminal records. 
1.  Disparate Impact Claims 
According to Title VII, it is unlawful to use an employment practice that 
has a discriminatory effect on individuals of a certain race, gender, or national 
origin.113  Disparate impact claims are filed to challenge a seemingly neutral 
employment practice that has a significant negative impact on a protected 
 
 108. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 741, 750 (2005). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 750–51. 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
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group.114  While disparate impact claims could theoretically provide relief 
for minorities without criminal records, these claims are extremely hard to 
win for two reasons. 
First, courts impose onerous evidentiary requirements on plaintiffs 
bringing disparate impact claims.115  For example, courts have held that the 
disparate impact data must be from the precise geographical area in issue.116  
Furthermore, the data must demonstrate that the practice had a negative effect 
on the particular applicant pool in question, not simply a theoretical pool of 
applicants.117  This evidence is typically very hard to obtain, especially for 
plaintiffs alleging unconscious discrimination.118  These specific and 
extensive requirements have led one scholar to conclude that “the heightened 
standard courts are applying often serves as a death knell for disparate impact 
actions.”119 
Second, there is apparent judicial resistance to recognizing subjective 
decision making, such as when employers choose to hire an applicant, as a 
challengeable employment practice.120  Disparate impact claims typically 
challenge a seemingly objective policy, such as minimum height 
requirements121 or arbitrary benchmarks for scores on intelligence tests.122  
A number of courts have held that subjective decision making itself cannot 
be considered a policy that discriminates.123  Absent an employment practice 
that has a discriminatory effect, courts refuse to apply a disparate impact 
analysis.124  Accordingly, disparate impact claims are unlikely to be a source 
of relief for a rejected applicant because the applicant would be challenging 
 
 114. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971) (holding that the 
company’s employment practice of requiring high school completion and a satisfactory score 
on a general intelligence test was in violation of Title VII where the policy had no correlation 
with successful performance of the job and reduced promotions for African American 
employees). 
 115. See Hart, supra note 110, at 783–84. 
 116. See, e.g., Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 1283, 1302–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(holding that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof because the proffered data did not 
cover the precise geographic area in issue). 
 117. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding 
that the EEOC’s statistical analysis comparing the expected and actual employment patterns 
for truck driver positions in the specific city of the discrimination was insufficient and that a 
successful claim includes data showing the national origin and race of the relevant labor 
market, as well as the specific applicant data that showed the exact number of Latino drivers 
who were precluded because of the employment practice). 
 118. See Smith, supra note 22, at 207.  Even if plaintiffs can present this proof, employers 
can use the business necessity defense, which conditions that the employer’s hiring policy is 
valid if it is shown to be fundamental to securing appropriate employees for the business.  
Courts are very sympathetic to a company’s business necessity. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 
(concluding that Title VII did not purport to give employment without regard to 
qualifications). 
 119. Smith, supra note 22, at 207. 
 120. See Hart, supra note 110, at 783. 
 121. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977). 
 122. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32. 
 123. See Hart, supra note 110, at 783. 
 124. See id. 
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a subjective hiring decision.125  Therefore, disparate impact lawsuits are not 
a practical option for individuals adversely affected by ban-the-box laws. 
2.  Disparate Treatment 
and the McDonnell Douglas Framework 
Disparate treatment claims, the focus of this Note, are brought when there 
is alleged discrimination occurring in specific employment decisions.126  
Under Title VII, rejected job applicants can sue based on the belief that they 
were individually wronged when the employer refused to hire them because 
of their race, color, gender, religion, or national origin despite being 
qualified.127  Most employment discrimination lawsuits are brought by 
individuals asserting disparate treatment claims.128 
In a disparate treatment lawsuit, plaintiffs can present either direct or 
circumstantial evidence to prove the employment discrimination.129  For 
example, if the employer states “only a man should be hired for this job,” a 
rejected female applicant would have direct evidence that she was not hired 
because of her gender.  However, more frequently, the plaintiff must rely on 
circumstantial evidence to establish discrimination.130 
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a model for disparate 
treatment cases with circumstantial evidence that shifts evidentiary burdens 
from the applicant to the employer and then back again.131  This method, first 
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,132 is referred to as the 
McDonnell Douglas framework.133 
According to the framework, the plaintiff must first establish the prima 
facie elements of the disparate treatment case.134  The prima facie elements 
for failure to hire claims are that (1) the plaintiff falls within a protected class, 
(2) the plaintiff was qualified for the work for which he or she applied, (3) 
the plaintiff was not hired, and (4) the employer in question continued to look 
for others with the same qualifications or hired someone with the same or 
lesser qualifications who was not in the protected class.135 
The burden on the plaintiff of establishing a prima facie disparate 
treatment case is not meant to be onerous.136  The plaintiff merely has the 
 
 125. See id. (“The judicially imposed standards for prevailing in a disparate impact case 
have become so onerous that plaintiffs may be making the extremely sensible judgment that 
they will be unable to prevail on these claims.”). 
 126. See id. at 750–51. 
 127. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 128. See Hart, supra note 110, at 750–71. 
 129. See id. at 750. 
 130. See id. at 751. 
 131. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The critical issue 
before us concerns the order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging 
employment discrimination.”). 
 132. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 133. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (discussing 
the Court’s application of the McDonnell Douglas framework). 
 134. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
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initial burden of showing that it is more likely than not that the employer’s 
actions were the result of discrimination.137  Additionally, the McDonnell 
Douglas framework is intended to be flexible, as the facts of each disparate 
treatment claim will vary.138  If the plaintiff meets the prima facie burden, 
this creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against 
the employee or job applicant.139 
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
employer to give a lawful reason for the rejection of the applicant.140  This is 
a burden of production, not persuasion.141  In Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine,142 the Supreme Court concluded that the 
employer’s burden at this stage is to articulate a legitimate reason to create a 
triable issue of fact.143  The employer does not need to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason was, in fact, the true 
motivation behind the decisions.144  Therefore, if the employer articulates a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for not hiring the applicant, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff without further analysis.145  In addition, if 
this happens, the original presumption of discrimination created by the 
successful prima facie case is rebutted.146 
If the burden shifts back to the rejected job applicant to prove that the 
employer’s articulated nondiscriminatory reasons are actually a pretext for 
discrimination, the factual inquiry moves to a higher level of specificity, 
forcing the plaintiff to produce additional information beyond the prima facie 
case.147  To meet this higher standard, the plaintiff must present some 
evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably ascertain that (1) the 
employer’s proffered legitimate reason is false or (2) a discriminatory reason 
was “more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
employer’s action.”148  The plaintiff may point to implausibility and 
inconsistencies in the employer’s reasons.149  Additionally, the plaintiff may 
use comparative evidence to show the discrepancies between the treatment 
of individuals within the protected class and those outside of that group.150  
 
 137. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). 
 138. See id. at 575 (explaining that McDonnell Douglas was not intended to establish an 
inflexible rule). 
 139. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
 140. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 141. See Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 142. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
 143. See id. at 257. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Craig Hunter King, Employment Discrimination:  The Burden of Proof, 13 S.U. 
L. REV. 91, 97 (1986) (“It is unfortunate for the plaintiff that a satisfactory explanation by the 
defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the 
plaintiff’s initial evidence.”). 
 147. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. 
 148. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 149. Id. at 765. 
 150. See King, supra note 146, at 98.  For example, evidence showing that a similarly 
situated white employee was treated more favorably than an African American employee can 
be sufficient to establish pretext. See id. 
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This requirement to prove the true intent of the employer is often thought to 
be the largest barrier to proving discrimination. 
As Part II demonstrates, the McDonnell Douglas framework is not as 
plaintiff friendly as it appears.151  Over time, courts have manipulated it to 
such a degree that it has become increasingly easier for employers to escape 
liability and almost impossible for plaintiffs alleging hiring discrimination to 
gain relief.152 
II.  IS THERE ANY RELIEF AVAILABLE?:  
UNWORKABLE OPTIONS UNDER TITLE VII 
This part examines how the McDonnell Douglas framework provides an 
unbeatable obstacle for individuals who are alleging implicit discrimination 
in failure-to-hire claims, such as minorities without criminal records in ban-
the-box jurisdictions.  Some circuits have used an alternate scheme—a 
mixed-motive framework—that attempts to account for unconscious 
discrimination, but many other circuits have been reluctant to do so.  This 
part compares the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework and the newer 
mixed-motive framework and shows how the widespread application of the 
mixed-motive framework may strengthen plaintiffs’ success in employment 
discrimination claims. 
However, this part also demonstrates that failure-to-hire claims are still 
virtually unwinnable by plaintiffs, despite the potential improvement of a 
mixed-motive framework.  It describes additional obstacles confronting 
rejected job applicants who suspect that discrimination caused the adverse 
hiring decision. 
This part conducts this analysis to unveil the deficiencies of employment 
discrimination claims, which are more problematic than ever because of ban-
the-box legislation’s unintended detrimental effect on minorities without 
criminal records.  Without strong laws to protect individuals affected by 
unconscious discrimination, ban-the-box legislation is more harmful than 
productive.153 
A.  The McDonnell Douglas Single Motive Framework:  
The Death Knell of Failure-to-Hire Claims 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court constructed an analytical 
framework for disparate treatment cases where the evidence is 
circumstantial.154  Under this framework, plaintiffs have to prove that the 
discriminatory pretext is the employer’s only motivation for the adverse 
hiring decision.  The Supreme Court has continuously articulated the 
requirement of a singular explanation for the decision, concluding, “[T]he 
district court must decide which party’s explanation of the employer’s 
 
 151. See infra Part II.A. 
 152. See Tolson, supra note 83, at 366–68. 
 153. See, e.g., Agan & Starr, supra note 8; Doleac & Hanson, supra note 8. 
 154. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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motivation it believes.”155  There is no room for both explanations.  Although 
an employer may be partially motivated by discrimination, as long as the 
employer also articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the decision that 
persuades the fact-finder, the plaintiff cannot establish a pretext.156  
Accordingly, the McDonnell Douglas framework is known as the single-
motive framework because the framework only permits one motivation for 
the employer’s alleged discrimination.157 
Thus, the fact-finder must weigh the discriminatory reason against the 
proffered legitimate reason for the adverse employment action.  
Problematically, courts have seemingly put their thumb on the scale in favor 
of the employer and have gone to great lengths to ensure that the fact-finder 
discovers a plausible nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.  
In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,158 the Supreme Court held that the fact-
finder could continue to look for nondiscriminatory explanations for the 
employer’s actions even after the plaintiff had shown the employer’s original 
reason was pretextual.159  In Hicks, a black plaintiff was being subjected to 
repeated and severe disciplinary actions under a new supervisor.160  
Subsequently, Hicks was fired after threatening his supervisor during an 
argument.161  Hicks provided sufficient evidence to show that other 
employees did not receive the same disciplinary actions.162  In fact, other 
employees who committed more serious violations were treated more 
leniently than Hicks.163  Although the Court considered this evidence 
sufficient to prove pretext, the Court stated that the trier of fact was free to 
look for another nondiscriminatory reason to account for Hicks’s termination, 
such as the threat or the argument.164  If the trier of fact believes that the 
employer was more likely motivated by a nondiscriminatory reason rather 
than a discriminatory one, the trier of fact could disregard the original 
evidence of pretext and find for the employer. 
Legal scholars have interpreted the Court’s decision as a “pretext plus 
rule,” where the plaintiff has to prove that the original proffered reason was 
pretext and then subsequently discredit any additional nondiscriminatory 
motives for the adverse decision.165  Later, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc.,166 the Supreme Court stated that although the plaintiff’s 
evidence of a prima facie case and pretext is enough to support liability, this 
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evidence does not mandate a victory for the plaintiff.167  These judicial 
interpretations have essentially eliminated any likelihood of success for an 
employment discrimination plaintiff because an employer has multiple 
chances to refute a plaintiff’s already demanding evidentiary burden.168 
This single-motive framework and the pretext plus rule particularly harm 
plaintiffs alleging implicit bias.  The framework fails to account for the fact 
that an employer motivated by discrimination will almost always have other 
reasons to explain the decision.169  This is especially true for unconscious 
discrimination, which is more likely to occur where the decision maker can 
attribute her decision to some reason other than race.170  Because many 
people do not want to admit that they harbor racial prejudices, individuals 
exercising implicit bias will rationalize their decision on the basis of another 
nondiscriminatory reason.171  Therefore, an analytical framework that gives 
the court freedom to “discover” another decision-making factor protects 
employers who implicitly discriminate because it allows the employers to 
assert multiple reasons for the discriminatory decision.172  Employers are let 
off the hook because the single-motive framework means that the fact-finder 
can pick just one of the many reasons as the true motivation.173 
Furthermore, in unconscious discrimination cases, the employer’s business 
decision almost always wins because the implicit bias is seen as less credible 
than the employer’s proffered legitimate reason.174  The single-motive 
framework does not provide much hope for plaintiffs asserting unconscious 
discrimination.  Thus, rejected job applicants who suspect that discrimination 
played a role in their rejection cannot bring successful claims against the 
employer.  Therefore, in ban-the-box jurisdictions that employ the single-
motive framework, there is no incentive for employers to address implicit 
bias.  Additionally, there is no legal relief for minorities who are experiencing 
heightened discrimination due to ban-the-box laws. 
B.  The Mixed-Motive Framework:  
A Glimmer of Hope in a Few Jurisdictions 
Scholars argued that, as discrimination in the workplace changed, the 
McDonnell Douglas single-motive framework was insufficient to address 
unconscious decision making for the reasons suggested above.175  In 1989, 
the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins176 recognized the 
possibility that an employer’s actions may be motivated by multiple factors, 
concluding, “Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based on a 
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mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.”177  The majority in 
Price Waterhouse, however, limited the “mixed-motive” analysis to cases 
with direct evidence,178 drastically reducing the holding’s scope.179  The 
McDonnell Douglas framework would still be applied to any case with 
circumstantial evidence.180 
In response, Congress amended section 703 of Title VII in 1991 to read:  
“An unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice.”181  While some scholars and judges believed 
this amendment invalidated the legal distinction between circumstantial and 
direct evidence, many disagreed and much debate ensued over the 
interpretation of the amendment.182 
1.  The Desert Palace Doctrine 
In 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the direct 
evidence requirement constructed in Price Waterhouse was permitted under 
the new statutory language.183  The Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa184 
held that there was no direct evidence requirement within the statutory text 
and, therefore, direct evidence was not necessary for a mixed-motive jury 
instruction.185 
In Desert Palace, a female employee sued her employer after being fired 
from her position as a warehouse worker.186  Throughout her employment, 
Catharina Costa experienced a number of problems with the company’s 
management, resulting in escalating disciplinary actions.187  Costa was fired 
after getting into a physical altercation with a male coworker.188  The male 
coworker was not fired, according to the employer, because he had a clean 
disciplinary record.189  At trial, Costa provided evidence that she was 
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continuously disciplined more harshly than her male coworkers.190  The jury 
was given instructions based on the mixed-motive framework.191  The 
instructions were as follows: 
You have heard evidence that the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff was 
motivated by the plaintiff’s sex and also by other lawful reasons.  If you 
find that the plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in the defendant’s 
treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you 
find that the defendant’s conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason.192 
The employer objected to this jury instruction because Costa had not 
provided direct evidence and, therefore, should only receive the single-
motive framework.193  The district court overruled this objection and the jury 
held in favor of Costa.194 
The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly applied the 
statutory language.195  According to the Court, the language unambiguously 
states that a plaintiff must demonstrate only that the employer unlawfully 
considered race, gender, or national origin in making an employment 
decision.196  The Court held that the statute could not require a single-motive 
framework, because the statute did not distinguish between cases based on 
direct versus circumstantial evidence.197 
This ruling appeared to be a remarkable triumph for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs.198  On first impression, the decision allowed the 
mixed-motive framework to replace the McDonnell Douglas framework in 
disparate treatment cases with direct or circumstantial evidence.199  Thus, 
this interpretation would render the McDonnell Douglas single-motive 
framework dead; the mixed-motive framework would be the only analysis 
allowed.200  Instead, however, confusion and an apparent reluctance to apply 
this new standard followed, resulting in a split among circuit courts.201 
2.  The Desert Palace Split 
The circuit courts have interpreted the Desert Palace holding in conflicting 
ways, leading to vastly different applications and results throughout the lower 
courts.  The difference in interpretation is over when the mixed-motive 
framework applies.202  Some circuits apply the mixed-motive framework to 
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every stage of the case from summary judgment through jury instructions at 
trial.203  By contrast, the Eighth Circuit interprets the Desert Palace holding 
to be limited to jury instructions.204  Therefore, courts in the Eighth Circuit 
rejected the application of Desert Palace at the summary judgment stage and 
employed the McDonnell Douglas analysis instead.205 
Summary judgment is a crucial stage for all litigants, but this phase is 
especially critical for employment discrimination plaintiffs.206  Nearly three-
quarters of all federal employment discrimination lawsuits are resolved in 
whole or in part on summary judgment, which is the highest summary 
judgment rate out of all litigation categories.207  This elevated rate matters 
for a few important reasons.  First, it means that most employment 
discrimination plaintiffs do not have an opportunity to present their story and 
to feel as if they have received fair judicial process.208  Furthermore, 
summary judgment proceedings influence the amount and likelihood of a 
settlement offer.209  Additionally, judges, not juries, rule on summary 
judgment and have been shown to defer to employers’ business judgment at 
higher rates than juries.210  As a result, this discrepancy has substantial effects 
on the outcomes of employment discrimination lawsuits.211 
a.  The Eighth Circuit Approach 
The Eighth Circuit has held that Desert Palace has no effect on the 
McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary judgment phase.212  Under 
this interpretation, the mixed-motive analysis is applied only during posttrial 
jury instruction.213  Accordingly, the plaintiff can survive the summary 
judgment phase only if the plaintiff can show that race was the true 
motivating factor behind the employer’s decision rather than the employer’s 
legitimate business reason.214  In Griffith v. City of Des Moines,215 the court 
concluded that evidence of additional motives and their effect on the 
plaintiff’s claim are trial issues.216  At summary judgment, the only inquiry 
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is whether the plaintiff has adequate evidence to show that the employer was 
motivated by discriminatory factors and not a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason.217 
Following this interpretation, the Eighth Circuit continues to use the 
single-motive framework in the summary judgment stage.  In Sallis v. 
University of Minnesota,218 the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment 
for the employer, stating that the plaintiff’s claim failed under McDonnell 
Douglas because he could not show that university’s reason for not hiring 
him was pretextual.219  The plaintiff, Sallis, alleged that he was denied a 
position at the university on the basis of race.220  Sallis presented evidence 
that the supervisor used racial epithets and openly complained about 
employees of a certain national origin.221  The court was unconvinced and 
noted that Sallis failed to show that “the actual motivating factor was race 
discrimination.”222  The Eighth Circuit was unwilling to consider the race-
based comments as a possible motivating factor behind the decision not to 
hire the plaintiff.  Therefore, the plaintiff’s case was dismissed.223 
b.  The Ninth Circuit Approach 
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that the Desert 
Palace framework applies at the summary judgment phase.224  Consequently, 
plaintiffs will survive the summary judgment stage with evidence that race, 
gender, or national origin may have been a motivating factor in the 
employer’s adverse action. 
In a case with similar facts to Sallis, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer.225  In this case, the 
female plaintiff was suspended from her position as a pilot and sued her 
employer alleging sex discrimination.226  The plaintiff presented facts that 
other male pilots had made sex-related remarks and complained that the 
plaintiff had a “machismo attitude.”227  While the airline provided facts to 
show that there were sufficient concerns about the plaintiff’s flying 
abilities,228 there was also some evidence that male pilots with similar 
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deficiencies in ability were given additional remedial training instead of 
being suspended.229  The Ninth Circuit held that “very little evidence is 
necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer’s motive” 
because the ultimate question must be resolved through an in-depth inquiry 
conducted by the fact-finder with a full record.230  Therefore, the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer was improper because 
the plaintiff alleged the minimal evidence necessary.231 
In Metoyer v. Chassman,232 the plaintiff sued her employer for race 
discrimination under Title VII after she was fired from her position at the 
Screen Actors Guild.233  The plaintiff, Patricia Metoyer, alleged that many of 
her supervisors at the Screen Actors Guild had made blatantly racist 
comments.234  Other minority employees had also complained about racial 
discrimination.235  In response, the employer presented evidence that 
Metoyer inappropriately used grant funds of over $30,000, which Metoyer 
admitted.  Still, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment for the employer because the plaintiff proffered evidence that race 
may have been a motivating factor in the employer’s decision in addition to 
the defendant’s legitimate reason for terminating her employment.236  Thus, 
summary judgment was denied because the court could not rule out the 
possibility that race played a role in the decision.237 
From these two cases, it is evident that the Ninth Circuit is using a mixed-
motive framework at the summary judgment stage, allowing plaintiffs to 
proceed with the case where there is some evidence that race, gender, or 
national origin may be one possible motivating factor.238  This approach is 
especially crucial for individuals alleging unconscious discrimination in the 
hiring process because it increases the detection of implicit bias.239  For 
reasons stated above, unconscious discrimination typically occurs in contexts 
where the decision maker has another reason to justify the decision.240  The 
Ninth Circuit approach allows this discrimination to factor into the legal 
outcome instead of being passed over in favor of the employer’s 
nondiscriminatory reason.241  Thus, if courts are willing to consider evidence 
of possible discrimination, even where the employer states a legitimate 
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business reason, plaintiffs alleging hiring discrimination have an opportunity 
to present their case.242 
C.  The Additional Evidentiary Problems 
in Hiring Discrimination Claims 
In addition to the grueling task of proving unconscious discrimination, 
minorities who are discriminated against in the hiring phase encounter other 
evidentiary problems specific to failure-to-hire claims.  First, a plaintiff 
alleging hiring discrimination rarely has much information about the 
employer because of the limited interactions between the employer and the 
rejected applicant.243  In fact, the applicant may have never interacted with 
the employer beyond a brief interview.  Therefore, it is more challenging—
if not impossible—to prove that unlawful discrimination played a role in the 
hiring decision. 
For example, imagine an African American man who applies for a job at a 
local store.  He is qualified for the job with a high school diploma and 
previous work experience in the industry.  He interviews with the manager 
but is not offered the job.  The manager subsequently hires a white man for 
the position.  The African American man believes he was not given the job 
because of his race; he says he knows because of the manager’s tone and the 
way the other employees looked at him.244  But he will not be able to prove 
it.245  Under the single-motive framework, he can establish the prima facie 
case, but the employer needs only one legitimate reason why the applicant 
was not a good fit and the case is over.246  Even under the mixed-motive 
framework, the likelihood of success is small without any more evidence of 
(even subtle) discrimination, such as the manager’s racist remarks or 
differential treatment of the store’s current employees based on race.247  
Although discrimination may be a motivating factor, this evidence is hard to 
acquire for failure-to-hire claims because there is little opportunity to observe 
this type of bias.248  Thus, despite the mixed-motive analysis, this plaintiff is 
likely to lose. 
Secondly, in addition to the lack of proof, plaintiffs alleging hiring 
discrimination are unlikely to prevail because courts are extremely 
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deferential to employers’ hiring decisions.249  For example, in Wright v. 
Western Electric Co.,250 Curtis Wright, an African American man, applied 
for a job as an electronic technician and was rejected.251  The court held that 
Wright was qualified for the position because he had two years of electronic 
technician education and eleven years of experience in the field.252  In 
response, however, the employer stated that Wright’s answers in his 
interviews showed an inadequate level of knowledge for the position.253  The 
court, using the McDonnell Douglas framework, ruled in favor of the 
employer.254  The court was entirely unwilling to consider that race 
motivated the hiring decisions, despite evidence that Wright was highly 
qualified for the job when compared to the applicants that were eventually 
hired.255  Instead, the court relied on the employer’s statement that the 
plaintiff appeared to have insufficient knowledge during the interview.256  
This decision suggests that the court would have decided similarly under the 
mixed-motive framework because of the court’s extreme deference to the 
employer’s reason. 
Similarly, in Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,257 the employer stated 
that the applicant had a very poor interview performance, which led to the 
decision to not hire him.258  Although the employee argued that he performed 
well in the interview and that the reason was simply a pretext for 
discrimination, the court viewed the employer’s assertion that the interview 
was poor as a fact.259  While this deference to the employer is consistent with 
the reasonable belief that employers can evaluate and reject job applicants 
regardless of how the applicant evaluates his own employability, this concept 
makes these claims even harder to win. 
III.  KEEPING THE BOX BANNED 
AND REVAMPING THE CURRENT DOCTRINE 
Throughout the past few decades, legal scholars have noted a great 
deficiency in employment discrimination doctrine, especially concerning 
unconscious discrimination.260  Now, postimplementation studies of ban-the-
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box laws have presented new data about the prevalence of unconscious 
discrimination in the hiring process, specifically toward minority males.261  
However, the studies also show that ban-the-box policies are valuable for 
formerly incarcerated individuals seeking employment.262  While some 
advocates are calling for the removal of ban-the-box laws to eliminate the 
harmful effects on applicants without criminal histories,263 the better solution 
is to use the unintended consequence of ban-the-box laws as motivation to 
finally reform hiring discrimination doctrine. 
Lawmakers must provide a sufficient remedy to applicants who are 
discriminated against during the hiring process.  Currently, the success rate 
for plaintiffs bringing disparate impact or disparate treatment claims is 
dismal.264  One study shows that employment discrimination plaintiffs win 
about 15 percent of the time in federal court, compared to plaintiffs in all 
other civil cases whose win rate is about 51 percent.265  Consequently, some 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are hesitant to bring employment discrimination lawsuits 
because the chances of winning are so slim.266 
If legislatures, legal scholars, and judges can make employment 
discrimination litigation a viable option for applicants, formerly incarcerated 
individuals and minority males without criminal records can be treated fairly 
in the hiring process.  To mitigate the consequences of ban the box, the 
winnability of these lawsuits must be strengthened through (1) the application 
of that the mixed-motive framework to all stages of a lawsuit and (2) 
increased access to reliable information for plaintiffs alleging racial 
discrimination. 
A.  Applying the Mixed-Motive Framework 
to All Phases of the Case 
As many scholars have argued, the mixed-motive framework should be 
applied to all stages of litigation.267  Unlike the mixed-motive framework, 
the single-motive framework relies on two inaccurate assumptions about the 
way people make employment decisions:  that decisions are based solely on 
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one factor and that people are aware of their decisions.268  As such, the single-
motive framework undermines important policy goals.269 
The mixed-motive framework, however, accurately reflects our 
multifaceted decision-making processes.270  Very few decisions are made 
based on a single reason; most decisions are derived from a variety of 
factors.271  This is especially true when implicit bias is involved because 
decision makers justify their unconscious biases with other reasons.272  Yet, 
the single-motive framework relies on monocausality, or the idea that people 
rely on one factor when making decisions.273  This is reflected throughout 
the single-motive framework, including the requirement of identifying the 
“real reason” for the adverse decision in the pretext phase.274  Where there is 
no room for another plausible explanation, the plaintiff is left to convince the 
fact-finder that the employer’s seemingly legitimate reason is actually a 
“sham” or “cover up” for the employer’s true discriminatory motive.275  
Employment discrimination attorney Linda Krieger puts it bluntly, 
explaining that to win she “would have to prove that the [employer] was a 
racist and a liar.”276 
In actuality, the employer can truthfully articulate a nondiscriminatory 
reason for not hiring the plaintiff and still have an unconscious discriminatory 
motive.277  The mixed motive accounts for this and enables the plaintiff to 
argue that, despite a well-intentioned decision-making process, the employer 
was partially motivated by an unconscious bias.278  Accordingly, this 
framework not only reduces acrimony but also increases the potential that the 
fact-finder will recognize the role of implicit bias in the adverse decision.279 
The mixed-motive framework also accounts for the likelihood that the 
employer is unaware of the underlying factors behind its decision.280  There 
is substantial evidence that well-intentioned people categorize and stereotype 
through an automatic unconscious process.281  Research shows that people 
are highly inaccurate when identifying the effects of certain factors, such as 
stereotypes, on their evaluations or choices.282  Additionally, when people 
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are asked to explain why they made a certain decision, they misattribute or 
fabricate the factors they based their decision on.283 
The single-motive doctrine fails to recognize that decision makers most 
likely cannot accurately identify why they made a particular decision, 
especially if implicit bias is playing a role in the decision-making process.284  
Thus, an analysis that rests on the assumption that employers are rational 
actors who are aware of their unconscious motives is entirely ineffective.285  
Moreover, this framework distorts the truth and relies on information that we 
know to be unreliable, such as an employer’s account of how he came to a 
certain hiring decision.286  Although it retains some of these flaws, the mixed-
motive framework more accurately accounts for the way people remember 
their decision-making processes by allowing the fact-finder to consider 
multiple reasons for a decision.  In this way, the fact-finder can acknowledge 
that unconscious discrimination may play a role in an employer’s cognitive 
processes, even where other motivating factors are involved. 
Lastly, the mixed-motive framework better serves the policy goals behind 
employment discrimination law.287  Laws are enacted to encourage socially 
desirable actions and curtail socially undesirable behaviors.288  However, 
when a law is ineffective or unclear, individuals who are supposed to comply 
with the law cannot successfully do so.289  Thus, if lawmakers want 
employers to curtail discrimination during the hiring process, the law must 
be interpreted and enforced in this manner.290 
Moreover, the mixed-motive analysis must be applied at all stages if 
lawmakers want to reduce unconscious employment discrimination.  Under 
the mixed-motive framework, plaintiffs have a stronger legal threat against 
employers.291  As a result, employers may become aware of the prevalence 
of implicit bias and put systems in place to protect themselves against 
unconscious discrimination litigation.292  Undoubtedly, this solution will not 
eliminate implicit racism and sexism in our society.  However, unless the law 
targets and punishes those who unconsciously discriminate, the chances of 
reducing implicit bias is drastically minimized. 
B.  Increasing Information 
The analytical framework is only one part of the solution.  Even where the 
mixed-motive framework is applied, plaintiffs asserting unconscious hiring 
discrimination often lack sufficient proof.293  A large number of these cases 
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fail, or are never even filed, because the rejected applicant requires more 
information about the employer’s hiring process and trends.294  While the 
mixed-motive framework does help alleviate some of the evidentiary 
burdens,295 increasing the availability of employment information will equip 
plaintiffs with more of the necessary evidence.  Furthermore, if employers 
know this information is being collected and released, they may think more 
carefully about their employment decisions.296 
One of the ways this can be done is through a stronger commitment to the 
collection of employment data and to regulatory oversight and enforcement.  
Currently, under section 709 of Title VII, employers are required to keep 
records relevant to determinations of whether unlawful employment practices 
are occurring and make reports from these records.297  To comply with this 
mandate, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has 
established requirements for employers.298  Each year, employers must file a 
form, known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Form (EEO-1).299  
Under its authority, the EEOC requires employers to indicate each 
employee’s job description, gender, and race on the EEO-1 form.300  
Additionally, the EEOC mandates that employers keep records regarding 
hiring, promotion, demotion, termination, and compensation rates.301  The 
EEOC also has the authority to require employers to keep records regarding 
the hiring process, including data regarding the race and gender of their 
applicants, when necessary to accomplish the goals of Title VII.302 
In practice, the EEO-1 form appears to be a useful tool for advocates 
fighting against employment discrimination.  The effectiveness of the EEO-
1 data collection requires government enforcement.303  While this process 
was successful in the early 1980s,304 the government commitment to regulate 
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employers through this data has declined since the Reagan administration.305  
Without government commitment to audit employers and ensure compliance 
with the EEOC requirements, the EEO-1 forms will be ineffective.306 
While data collection and the accompanying commitment to audit and 
analyze that data is a promising starting point, the current regulatory 
framework does not do enough to provide information to rejected applicants.  
An expansion of data collection and oversight would supply employment 
discrimination litigants with essential evidence and would serve as an 
incentive for employers to critically monitor their hiring decisions. 
1.  Evidence for Hiring Discrimination Plaintiffs 
If employment discrimination plaintiffs have the opportunity to acquire 
and use reliable information to establish that discrimination was one of the 
motivating factors in the adverse employment decision, these individuals 
would have more success.  EEO-1 forms could potentially provide plaintiffs 
with critical information to use as evidence when alleging hiring 
discrimination.307  As such, the EEOC should require employers to do more.  
For example, the EEOC should use its authority to mandate that employers 
maintain data regarding the demographics of their job applicants and their 
hiring procedures, including how they reviewed each document and how they 
decided whether the applicant was a good fit.308 
While this may appear to be an onerous burden, many employers likely 
already have some internal tracking system for applications that would make 
this fairly easy to do.  For example, the company could click a box after the 
application was reviewed or an interview was conducted that would indicate 
why the applicant was not hired, such as insufficient work experience, 
unsatisfactory knowledge of the field, or incompatible attitude.  This 
information, although it may be a valid reason for rejection, still provides 
additional knowledge about why the applicant was rejected.  Furthermore, 
the EEOC can audit employers’ data and discern, for example, whether 
applicants of certain races or genders are consistently rejected for insufficient 
work experience when other applicants are being hired with the same work 
experience.  In this way, this information collected by the EEOC can arm 
employment discrimination plaintiffs with necessary evidence and increase 
their chances of winning unconscious discrimination claims. 
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2.  Impetus for Employer Self-Regulation 
In addition to creating evidence for employment discrimination plaintiffs, 
this data collection is essential to changing the way employers think about 
hiring discrimination.  Some scholars suggest that this type of compliance 
oversight would more effectively alter employment practices than litigation 
itself.309  If employers are aware that data are being collected, they will be 
more likely to think about the real reasons behind their hiring decisions.310  
As research shows, increased attention to decision-making processes can lead 
to greater recognition that stereotyping may be a reason for a decision.311  
Therefore, requiring employers to pay more attention to their motivations 
behind a hiring decision can lead to increased awareness of implicit bias, 
which is an essential step to eliminate bias.312 
Ideally, this newfound awareness would mean that companies could, and 
would, self-regulate their unconscious discrimination and change their 
employment practices.  Legal scholars believe that employers have a wide 
array of options to eliminate unconscious bias, including diversity hiring 
initiatives and gender or ethnicity sensitivity training.313  Additionally, 
employers have the ability to consistently monitor and evaluate their 
workplace statistics and require their employees to appraise their implicit 
biases through the free IAT test.314  In fact, many employers have started to 
use the insights from implicit bias tests to inform their hiring practices.315  
Employers committed to eliminating unconscious bias, as enforced by the 
threat of litigation and the EEOC’s oversight, are well equipped and may be 
in the best position to reach this goal. 
CONCLUSION 
With almost 700,000 Americans being released from prison every year, 
increasing employment opportunities for formerly incarcerated individuals is 
an essential piece of criminal justice reform.316  In an attempt to combat 
hiring discrimination against formerly incarcerated individuals, many 
lawmakers have advocated and passed ban-the-box legislation.317  Although 
postimplementation studies have found these laws are helping formerly 
incarcerated individuals, the legislation is increasing unconscious 
discrimination against minority males without criminal records.318  
Problematically, employment discrimination litigation currently does not 
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adequately protect plaintiffs alleging unconscious discrimination, leaving 
minority males without criminal records with essentially no legal recourse 
against the documented discrimination they face.  Accordingly, ban-the-box 
laws can only be justified if employment discrimination doctrine provides 
individuals adversely affected by the laws with relief. 
Therefore, instead of eliminating ban-the-box legislation, lawmakers 
should use the negative unintended consequence of ban-the-box laws as 
motivation to strengthen employment discrimination doctrine through two 
main reforms.  The application of the mixed-motive framework to all stages 
of litigation, along with an increase in oversight and data collection from the 
EEOC, will cause employers to become more aware of the prevalence of 
employment discrimination and work to combat unconscious bias in their 
hiring processes.  Moreover, racial minorities will be able to successfully 
gain legal relief for the heightened racial discrimination in ban-the-box 
jurisdictions.  In this way, the negative unintended consequence of ban-the-
box laws can prompt tremendous and positive changes in the fight to reduce 
employment discrimination for both formerly incarcerated individuals and 
racial minorities. 
